Russian President Vladimir Putin seems desperate to find ways to break the chains of diplomatic isolation that have gradually stifled the Russian economy despite continued manipulation of the open and unregulated energy market through price levers.
In his rare virtual year-end meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping via video link on Monday, December 30, he appeared to be unnaturally smitten with Xi and went against his trademark arrogance to appease his Chinese counterpart.
“We are waiting for you, dear Mr. President, dear friend, we are waiting for you next spring on a state visit to Moscow. This will demonstrate to the whole world the strength of Russian-Chinese ties on key issues, ”this is how Putin tried to exhibit his“ extraordinary affection ”for Xi.
This is in stark contrast to the characteristic arrogance of Putin, who is famous for intimidating world leaders during diplomatic interactions through his verbal and non-verbal communication.
Keeping others waiting by being late for scheduled sessions, using extremely long tables for bilateral meetings to symbolize “distance”, bringing your favorite dog to official meetings, and paying more attention to your pet than guests as a gesture of intimidation are some of the methods he has used in the past to record his arrogance.
However, it appears that the Ukraine war and its economic and political implications have forced him to go the extra mile to woo Xi. But Xi’s response to Putin’s cordiality was rather tepid. He bluntly told his Russian counterpart that the road to Ukraine peace talks would not be easy and that China would continue to uphold its “objective and fair stance” on the issue.
Yes, Xi showed a willingness for close coordination between Beijing and Moscow on international affairs and offered to facilitate Russia’s willingness to enter into negotiations on Ukraine, but backed away from backing Putin in his Ukraine misadventure in no uncertain terms.
“You and I share the same views on the causes, course and logic of the ongoing transformation of the global geopolitical landscape, in the face of unprecedented pressure and provocations from the West,” Putin told Xi in his video conference while He offered full support to China on the Taiwan issue and hopes to boost Sino-Russian military ties.
Interestingly, while Xi expressed readiness to increase strategic cooperation with Russia in what he called a “difficult” situation on the global stage, he did not mention any plans to increase military collaboration. Interestingly, the two signed a “no limits” strategic partnership in February last year, spurred by a shared distrust of the West, a few days before Russian troops invaded Ukrainian territory in what Putin calls a “special military operation”.
China is undoubtedly perceived as Russia’s most crucial ally in the Ukraine war. However, over the past 10 months, we have witnessed many confusing and rather contradictory adjustments in China’s stance. Instead of voting in favor of Russia, China preferred to abstain from the UN Security Council and General Assembly resolutions in March last year.
Similarly, regarding sanctions on Russia, China has been showing reasonable compliance with the rest of the world. Rumors abound that China was aware of the impending invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 because Russia waited for the culmination of the Beijing Winter Olympics before sending troops across the border.
Since the start of the invasion of Ukraine, China has verbally pledged its support for Russia. But recent events seem to show that China is now moving slightly away from this stance. Is there a change of heart? The answer, in part, is yes.
A Russian victory is not what China wants or expects. Russia’s victory will certainly embolden Putin, who currently plays the role of junior partner in Xi’s anti-Western efforts, to regain an assertive role in the global power structure. In the event of a Russian victory, the country would eventually emerge considerably stronger than it was before launching the invasion, prompting Putin to think about what it would take to create a new Soviet Union.
A stronger Russian federation, and Putin, will certainly reduce the chances of playing second fiddle. In that case, Putin would rather pursue his own high-octane power agenda and cast Russia as an equal player with the US and China in a new tripolar power configuration, rather than continue to pose as China’s ally. A strong and resurgent Putin would certainly be a dirty scenario for the Chinese in the long run, as it would be very difficult for Beijing to prevent Putin from pursuing his ambitious agenda. Putin would be free to maneuver at his whim and could even directly harm Chinese interests.
This is what Xi and his colleagues would not like to see happen. Historically, Russia and China have always been traditional adversaries and have been locked in clashes over different issues. The recent love affair between the two is the result of the circumstantial convergence of their mutual anti-American and anti-Western drive amidst the rapidly evolving global power equation.
Ostensibly, the defeat of Russia at the end of a protracted war of aggression in the Ukraine is what serves Chinese interests at the moment. Russia will have no choice but to become a permanent junior partner in China’s global agenda. A sharply weakened Russia, cut off from the West, would be forced to go along with China in the guise of a meek ally.
For Beijing, the only possible negative consequence of Russia’s defeat could be the rise of a pro-Western regime in Moscow. But this is a very long shot. Yes, a defeat in the Ukraine will drastically reduce Putin’s power and an internal revolt cannot be ruled out.
However, Putin has very few rivals in the United Russia party or in any opposition party that might challenge him at the moment. At the same time, there is no prominent pro-Western lobby in Russia with enough potential to overthrow him.
The two most prominent Russian opposition parties, Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s far-right party and the Communists, cannot be classified as pro-Western at all. Nor is Putin likely to leave the stage calmly in the event of a defeat. A “wounded” Putin may become more aggressive and reactive in order to save his own base at home in anticipation of any possible moves by infiltrators.
That is why the Chinese are treading the Ukraine episode very carefully and keeping their cards close to their chest. China apparently does not want Russia to emerge as a tangible winner from this imbroglio because a victorious Russia will become overly assertive and difficult for Beijing to handle, while a defeated and kidnapped Russia would have only one choice: accept China as a big brother and play the role of junior partner. Perhaps this is what the Chinese expect at the end of the Ukraine episode.
However, the recent virtual meeting between Putin and Xi reflects growing anxiety on both sides: Putin is certainly on the defensive after a series of military fiascoes in Ukraine and wants to bolster his position by projecting “closeness” with Beijing. Xi is also facing a difficult time on the home front after abandoning his strict zero-Covid policy, which has resulted in a massive resurgence of the pandemic and an unprecedented wave of protests against his containment policy.
Dr. Imran Khalid is a freelance international affairs columnist based in Karachi, Pakistan. He graduated as a doctor from Dow Medical University in 1991 and has a master’s degree in international relations from the University of Karachi.
