Russia’s nuclear exports have surged since the invasion of Ukraine, boosting Kremlin revenue and cementing its influence with a new generation of global buyers, as the United States and its allies avoid sanctions on the industry.
Exclusive trade data compiled by the UK’s Royal Institute of United Services shows that sales of Russian nuclear fuel and technology abroad increased by more than 20% in 2022. Purchases by members of the European Union reached their highest level in three years. From Egypt and Iran to China and India, business is booming.
Trading already makes a lot of money, but that’s not the full measure of its importance. Every time the Kremlin’s nuclear giant Rosatom PJSC agrees to build a new reactor, it secures cash flows—and political influence—for decades to come.
Atomic trading creates lasting relationships. It involves large upfront costs, and Russia typically provides the credit, and long-term agreements to service the plants, train their operators and refuel. That kind of financial and technical collaboration can also strengthen diplomatic ties.
“This is part of the great power competition we find ourselves in now,” says Edwin Lyman, director of nuclear power safety at the Union of Concerned Scientists in Washington. Russia’s leaders “see nuclear trade as a way to strengthen alliances.”
The task is made easier by the scarcity of competition. Russia continued to invest in manufacturing nuclear fuel and technology after the collapse of the Soviet Union, even as the industry atrophied in other parts of the world.
That’s one reason the United States and its European allies, which have been weighing sanctions against the Russian nuclear company since the beginning of the war, have failed to comply. The worry is that shutting down its own nuclear industries from Russian supplies would be too painful economically.
Rosatom provides about a fifth of the enriched uranium needed for the US’s 92 reactors. In Europe, the company is trusted by utilities that generate power for 100 million people.
The RUSI data comes from a third-party trading provider and is based on Russian customs records, says Darya Dolzikova, a sanctions analyst for the think tank. She says the figures are incomplete and don’t capture business with sanctioned countries like Iran. Numbers were validated where possible against publicly available export information.
“Nuclear power projects have very long time frames, so it’s hard to draw any definitive conclusions,” he said. “But the data points to a prioritization of markets that may be reluctant to sanction Russian nuclear energy exports or entities.”
Figures show that NATO members including Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia continued to buy Rosatom fuel last year, amid pleas from Ukraine to shut down the trade after Russia seized the largest power plant. big in Europe.
“Rosatom receives billions of dollars every year from its business abroad,” says Petro Kotin, president of the Ukrainian nuclear company Energoatom. “The money they are receiving is financing the war.” Ukraine imposed sanctions on Rosatom this month and urged other nations to do the same.
Yet even in Ukraine, nine reactors still under kyiv control rely on stored Russian fuel. It took years of planning, with the help of American advisers, to make the move to Westinghouse Electric Co., Kotin says, and full diversification won’t be possible for three or four years.
Countries like Bulgaria, Finland and Slovakia have also announced plans to swap suppliers. That hasn’t stopped Rosatom from expanding its European presence.
Hungary is providing support for two new reactors that were awarded to Rosatom without competitive bidding. Russia is covering 80% of the cost with a loan of 10 billion euros. When construction is complete in the next decade, the project will be one of the largest foreign investments in Eastern Europe. Hungary is among the EU countries opposed to including nuclear fuel in the bloc’s sanctions, while others such as Poland, Germany and the Baltic nations support the idea.
Data obtained by RUSI shows supplies of jet fuel aged on former Soviet satellites accounted for nearly two-fifths of Rosatom’s exports since 2019. But its fastest-growing markets lie further afield.
“This is a geostrategic technology, not a commercial one,” says Mark Hibbs, a Berlin-based nuclear analyst at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “By providing state funding, Russia can take financial risk off countries.”
Rosatom boss Alexey Likhachev said this month that the company is in talks with about 10 countries about new projects, with three or four close to signing intergovernmental agreements. In all the countries where Rosatom is already building nuclear plants, “everything is on track,” he said.
Rosatom is not harmed by non-proliferation rules imposed by the US Department of Energy. In India, under Western trade restrictions since testing a nuclear weapon in 1974, Russia supplies nuclear fuel and is building two reactors whose opening it is scheduled for 2025. In China last year, Rosatom provided more than $375 million in fuel for a reactor that the US Defense Department is concerned could bolster Beijing’s arsenal of nuclear weapons.
South Africa, which has received visits from top US and Russian officials in recent weeks, is a good example of the strategic dimension of atomic trade.
In the only African nation that currently operates nuclear power reactors, the government last month allowed a pact with the US to expire, giving it access to fuel in exchange for non-proliferation guarantees. That opened another door for Rosatom.
“They had high hopes in the past of doing in South Africa what they are doing in Egypt and Turkey, but on a larger scale,” says Hartmut Winkler, an energy researcher at the University of Johannesburg. “Rosatom is interested in contracts that give them leverage, especially in countries that claim neutrality when it comes to Ukraine.”
