The focus of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s visit to South Africa, eSwatini and Angola this week has been the representation of Russia as a partner for the continent. developing and security, especially in the Energy sector. The tour also had an overtly propaganda element meant to reinforce Russia’s tattered global image as it seeks to cultivate closer ties with African states in the context of its disastrous invasion of Ukraine in February.
He picture projected by the Russian state and state-aligned media is one of Russia and its African counterparts seriously trying to build better relations, despite the meddling of the West and its “neocolonial” policies.
However, given how little Russia can currently offer in economic terms, the development narrative is rather suspect. Before Russia’s full-scale invasion of the Ukraine, Moscow exported more to neighboring Belarus than it exported and imported from the 54 African states combined. Since the war and its economic consequences, Russia’s growth prospects appear bleakmeaning that ambitious financial, infrastructure, or commercial projects were unlikely to be launched.
On the economic front, the tour appears to have produced mixed results at best. While Lavrov and his counterparts in each country hailed the economic ties, only the announcement in Luanda of a possible deal for Russia to help Angola develop its own atomic Energy program was of any note.
As Russia’s nuclear power regulator Rosatom had said, without presence in Angola until 2019, the initiative will largely start from scratch and foreign Rosatom companies have often been delayed or ended up going nowherereason why the possible agreement can be in nothing.
What about the security element? In recent years, Russia has successfully carved out a niche for its defense and security industries in Africa and has become the continent’s largest arms manufacturer. vendor. Almost all countries in Africa has a security agreement with Moscow is in place, and many send military officers and specialists to receive training at Russian military academies. The state-aligned Wagner mercenary group is also active across the continent, with deployments of armed personnel or liaison offices in several countries, including Angola and eSwatini.
Lavrov’s tour served to highlight Moscow’s influence on security matters, although it also highlighted its limitations. That said, there were signs of a growing Russian security footprint in eSwatini, where Lavrov met with the prime minister and various other senior officials. The small kingdom has been plagued by unrest since 2020, with King Mswati III attempting to maintain absolute power over him despite widespread opposition to his rule.
In 2016, the two countries signed a military cooperation agreement focused on training Y intelligence sharing. The independent media of the country in exile have reported that Russian troops have trained the country’s army to suppress the restive population, an accusation denied by Moscow.
On January 19, the Russian ambassador to eSwatini saying that Moscow was prepared to offer security assistance to the kingdom. Officially, the country’s defense minister refused the suggestion, but met with Lavrov during his visit nonetheless.
South Africa is a less obvious security partner for Russia, with no military cooperation agreement between the two countries, nor a Wagner presence that we know of. While the two have signed agreements to jointly develop defense manufacturing, South Africa is not a huge market for Russian arms sales.
Despite this, Lavrov’s visit was preceded by the announcement that the Russian navy would be Union a 10-day South African-Chinese naval drill in the coastal waters around Durban.
The planned joint military exercises were criticized by South Africa’s political opposition, as well as the country’s Western partners. They are even more sensitive accusations made by members of the South African parliament recently that the government sold arms to Russia in 2022.
Even in Angola, which voted to condemn Russia’s phony referendums in eastern Ukraine at the UN in October despite a long history of close ties between the two countries, there were signs of growing cooperation.
In December, Angolan President João Lourenço said he would replace Russian weapons with US imports. sending an envoy to Luanda hot on Lavrov’s heels.
Lavrov’s visit was reportedly aimed at bringing Angola returned to the Russian fold, but the joint press conference, while friendly, did not suggest that Luanda has changed its position on Russian arms sales or the invasion of Ukraine.
Aside from an uncertain nuclear power deal with Angola, what did Lavrov’s visit achieve? Arguably, he fulfilled the main function of him to promote Russia’s wartime propaganda both domestically and domestically. elites and the general public in three African countries.
During the visit, Russian propaganda was sometimes repeated by state officials and often reproduced by local the media, while Lavrov’s comments on the war have also fed the usual disinformation mills and have been replayed many times on various platforms. Insofar as diplomacy is about getting a message across, Lavrov can be sure his whirlwind tour was a success.
Opinions expressed in opinion pieces do not necessarily reflect the position of The Moscow Times.
