At the end of January 2023, it will be five years since the African Union signed the African Union protocol on the free movement of people. A parallel initiative to the African Continental Free Trade Agreement, it was designed to lower barriers for Africans crossing African borders. The benefits of freer movement include trade, investment, cultural understanding, and scientific cooperation. Along with several colleagues at the New South Institute, Alan Hirsch is researching pathways to freer movement. He explains what is behind the countries’ hesitation to commit to the protocol. And he points to ways the initiative can move forward.
Why the hesitation?
There are several factors.
One of the main ones is the fear among member states that the Protocol on the free movement of people will suddenly enter into force as soon as the parliaments of 15 of the 55 member states have ratified it.
But, in fact, only the first of the three phases of the protocol will enter into force and only for the countries that had ratified it. Additionally, the protocol’s safeguards allow countries to suspend it if their concerns cannot be addressed through normal immigration procedures.
The fear among leaders is that the implementation will trigger political instability. Several of the wealthier countries in Africa appear to be concerned that once the protocol comes into force, they will experience a sudden influx of low-skilled economic migrants from poorer countries.
In fact, the protocol has safeguards against this. Still, the perception remains, and very few wealthier countries have signed the protocol, let alone ratified it.
Some feel that adequate systems for population registration, passports, criminal record exchange, extradition arrangements and similar forms of cooperation do not yet exist in or between many countries.
Even the term “free movement” is confusing. Although the protocol specifically refrains from referring to movement independent of the laws of the host state, some countries seem to fear that the result is unregulated movement on their territory.
In my opinion, the roadmap that accompanied the Protocol for the Free Movement of People was too ambitious. It added to the unnecessary panic.
What are the safeguards against large crowds?
First, states that adhere to the protocol can express reservations about certain elements of the agreement.
Second, they can add procedures for certain categories of migrants.
Third, in some circumstances, the protocol can be suspended.
And fourth, states can withdraw from the protocol entirely.
Furthermore, the protocol distinguishes between visa-free entry for short-term visitors and the right to longer stays and employment and residence.
The protocol implementation process consists of three phases. Initially, Phase I would only be activated for countries that ratified it in its entirety. It allows visitors visa-free access for three months.
Phase II allows for residency and will only come into force after the African Union Executive Council considers the implementation of the first phase and agrees to enforce Phase II.
Phase III grants the right to establish a business. This would also come into force only after the Executive Council of the African Union considers the implementation of the previous phases and agrees to go ahead.
In any of these phases, a host government may require foreign nationals to apply for a work permit and may manage those work permits under national law.
I can see how government officials would have a hard time understanding how all the pieces fit together. In many countries, responsibility for migration, work permits and security is divided among various government departments that do not necessarily work very well together, and security concerns tend to dominate.
What role do the regional blocs play?
Some regional blocs have already gone a long way in lifting restrictions on cross-border movement. The two most advanced regions are the East African Community (EAC) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). In some cases, they allow passport-free cross-border travel within the region. They have even been moving towards the adoption of regional passports.
What is interesting and important is that there is nothing in the AU protocol for the free movement of people that prevents the advancement of unconventional paths. In each region, some member countries may progress without the participation of all members of the regional group.
A recent report notes that:
There is an ongoing migration from the national passport to an EAC passport, but not all states are issuing the regional passport. EAC citizens from Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda move freely between the three countries using their national identity cards or EAC passport. This is a result of the removal of mobility restrictions enacted by Heads of State in 2013. On the other hand, Tanzania and Burundi require a passport for East Africans. Free movement has enabled the EAC to make significant progress in the field of social integration. Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda have also facilitated the right of establishment, the right of residence and access to the labor market for their citizens in all three states.
The protocol does not exclude these forms of “variable geometry” within regional economic communities. On the contrary: it would appear to be a valuable form of progress, one that could eventually draw other members of the economic community into the fold. Some countries that have already achieved a high level of mutual trust lead the way and others follow when they can.
In fact, due to the proximity of countries in regional groupings and their greater familiarity with each other, I think it is likely that free movement will first advance between groupings within regional communities.
In the future, there may well be room for agreements on the movement of people between like-minded regional economic communities, inter-community agreements, if you will.
What might encourage acceptance of the protocol?
It is easier to work with neighboring countries, which already have close relations and generally enjoy greater mutual understanding. Engagement with more distant countries could be facilitated through the use of common standards for documentation, information sharing, and agreement on procedures for dealing with undesirable immigrants, such as criminals. Other mechanisms to promote understanding should also be strongly supported: for example, cultural exchange programmes.
However, processes at the continental level should be encouraged, and it would be positive to move the free movement process closer to the free trade area process, especially if this regularly brings officials from across the continent to common talks on greater freedom of movement.
African countries are already making progress, often on their own initiative. The newly released Africa Visa Opening Report 2022 notes that 27% of all travel routes within Africa are visa-free for citizens of African countries. This represents an increase from 25% in 2021 and 20% in 2016. In 2022, 24 African countries (more than 40%) offered e-Visas to Africans and other travelers, compared to nine African countries (17% from the continent) in 2016.
This article first appeared in a similar form as an appendix to the Africa Visa Opening Report 2022.
alan hirschProfessor and Director of the Nelson Mandela School of Public Governance, University of Cape Town
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
